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I began writing this reply on New Year's Day. At least in our better
moments, we use that day to reflect on the past year's reasons for
gratitude and to make new commitments for the year ahead. That was
fitting. As a reason for gratitude, I am in the unusual position of
getting elaborate, written feedback on a book from two commenters
who are leaders in their fields,1 even though the project is only
complete in the sense that a first-draft manuscript exists. That sort of
thing seems hard to come by, especially for an unknown author
writing a first monograph. Both did that, by the way, even though they
are essentially strangers to me and even though there is nothing really
in it for them, after reading a very long manuscript that I delivered to
them catastrophically late. Moreover, Professor Peter Shane, this
journal's advisor, not only made the opportunity available, but took a
·James A. Thomas Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, c.sagers@csuohio.edu.
1
Guy A Rub, Amazon and the New World ofPublishing, 14 ISJLP 151, 367; Abraham L.
Wickelgren, Against Simplicity in Antitrust: A Comment on Chris Sagers' Apple,
Antitrust, and Irony, 14 ISJLP 151, 353.
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big chance on a book that still required a huge amount of writing on a
tight schedule. He also put up with a lot of delays and blown
deadlines. For those reasons, it would feel wrong to write this reply in
the usual manner of armed combat. Instead I've just tried to explain
how I'll use the valuable gift these three have handed me to make the
book better.
Anyway, as for new commitments, the coming year just happens to
be roughly the period I think it will take to finish this essentially half
done book. I already had a lot of resolutions for its final year, but they
now include fixing a new problem that seems serious: Certain things
plainly require clarification to avoid misunderstanding. In fact, I think
this little discussion was among three people who mostly agree with
each other, except that the reviewers may not have known it because I
failed to explain myself well enough. Because I didn't, they mostly
didn't discuss what I always intended to be the book's real
contribution and its most interesting material.
Early in writing the book, my excellent and far-seeing editor
pointed something out to me that is probably obvious, but that still
strikes me as foundational: there are problem-books and there are
solution-books. From the beginning I saw this as a problem-book, in
which solutions would play supporting roles at best. As I tried to make
clear in the book, but will now try do even more clearly, the reason
Apple seemed remarkable enough to write a book about was not its
facts or circumstances or the legal issues it raised. It was the fact that
popular reaction to it was so different than the antitrust-professional's
reaction. That in turn seemed to pose a very interesting theoretical
opportunity. Attacking it-working out that big-picture social
phenomenon in theoretical terms-is the problem at the heart of this
problem-book. In any case, while it is probably in some respect just
because policy prescriptions are what law professors do, both
reviewers apparently took it as a solution-book, especially Professor
Wickelgren. He gives mainly just a long critique of rules of per se
illegality in reply to a book that makes few if any real policy proposals
at all, much less recommendations for more per se rules.
That being the case, I will start out in Part I by trying to restate
what I see as the problem that is the book's only immediate concern.
That restatement will be a first draft for how I will try to clarify it in
the book. Part II will then react to the two critiques individually. They
happen to be full of useful points from which this book will benefit,
even beyond the clarification of its purpose. Even their specific
doctrinal points are apposite in that I do happen to set out some
thoughts of a doctrinal nature. (I do that for the practical reason that
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if I didn't, then this pretty down-beat book could be misunderstood as
me arguing that antitrust is hopeless or bad.) Part III briefly concludes
by saying what I think really was at the heart of these two reviews,
though they may seem quite different.

I. WHAT I REALLY MEANT
The big-picture theoretical problem that I envision was inspired by
something Thurman Arnold once said. (This is in the book, but at
present it appears way at the end, and it bears repeating here.) A bit
chillingly, he said it after having served as the nation's most
celebrated, tireless, and influential antitrust chief. On an academic
panel in the late 1940s, at which legal and economic scholars debated
whether antitrust had done any good, he said this:
The antitrust laws have not been effective in the real
world .... Unfortunately, all antitrust law enforcement
under any plan depends on the public attitude. 2
With that in mind, it dawned on me when first thinking about
Apple that the public view of antitrust had been poor toward antitrust
not just in that case, but in all kinds of cases, for a long time. That in
turn seemed important in understanding the larger political problem
of having a competition policy at all. It seemed promising to try to
figure out if any common themes unite the different cases that have
lacked popular support, however different they might otherwise seem.
And indeed, to me something did seem common among them.
The common theme is this: the very competition itself that is
supposed to be our preferred state of affairs is price competition.
Theoretical details vary and people fight over them, but basically,
price competition means comparatively numerous, autonomous units
vying non-cooperatively for the same customers, on the basis of
quality-adjusted price. As a practical matter our antitrust laws imply
that it is our default position, and that departures from it require
antitrust analysis. But it is in many respects disagreeable to its
participants and bystanders, even though it may generate the best
overall outcomes on an aggregate basis. Their incentives therefore are
to seek government or private protection from it, and to rationalize
2

Thurman Arnold, Symposium, The Effectiveness ofthe Federal Antitrust Laws, 39 AM.

ECON. REV. 690, 690 (1949).
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the protection as not just service of their own pecuniary interest. They
argue in many ways that protection is needed to preserve important
social values. And though their rationalizations will seem varied and
idiosyncratic-and though they may believe in them very sincerely-it
seemed to me that very often they could be understood as boiling
down to one, comparatively simple argument. The common thread
seemed to be that the pressure on firms to reduce their costs would in
some cases prevent them from doing things that would be otherwise
desirable. Apple is such a case, obviously enough. Some critics, for
example, said that publishers need protection from price competition
because if they are forced to cut costs in marketplace combat, they
won't subsidize high literature. Others said that very low retail prices
would reduce author royalties so much that they wouldn't write books
anymore. Other critics yet said that if Amazon could compete fiercely
on price, competing entrants would be unable to enter, because for
some reason or other no one else could devise the relevant technology
and negotiate the contracts. In other words, in each case the argument
was that if Amazon could set price where it wanted, exploiting
whatever advantages it had been able to come by, then markets would
be unable to do the most basic thing they are predicted by theory to
do. They would be unable to evolve institutional means to deliver the
things that are desired at the most desirable quality-adjusted price. I
then spend most of the book explaining that the same inner core
unifies all kinds of arguments people have made throughout the
history of competition law in all kinds of other cases. That is why I say
in the book that the many, highly varied arguments for special
treatment that have characterized the policy are in fact just disguised
opposition to competition itself. That claim may or may not prove as
true as I think it is, but it seems like an interesting and worthwhile
thing to explore, and it is wholly unrelated to the state of antitrust
doctrine.
I am aware that the argument will strike some as lumping together
theoretically distinct arguments that each deserve evaluation on their
own terms. Quite often the suspicion of price competition will be
formulated in externality terms, as with the fear of lost literary values
in publishing or the free-riding defense of resale price maintenance
(RPM). Other times it will manifest more like a classic destructive
competition argument, in claiming that some inherent flaw in a
market will keep firms from covering their basic costs of production. It
could probably take other, superficially distinct forms. But it doesn't
really matter. The precise form in which the instinct manifests itself is
not the point. My point instead was a political or sociological one. The
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common theme in these cases is a popular susceptibility to skepticism
of market outcomes, justified by more or less rigorous models in
which price competition itself precludes the optimal satisfaction of
some value. So, the problem is not precisely why people believe that a
market doesn't work in a given case, but their proneness to believe it
because they doubt that decentralized price rivalry can really
accomplish so much. Most specifically, what seems unifying in all the
theories I discuss is that they attempt to explain injuries or
dissatisfactions that really are just ordinary incidents of healthy
competition. In short, what unites the cases is a propensity to mistake
the ordinary losses characteristic of competition for idiosyncratic,
case-specific market defects.
I likened those models to the traditional destructive competition
reasoning of the turn of the 20th century in part for a possibly
unwholesome or manipulative reason. It links them with disfavored-.
theories, and I think the newer ones should be disfavored too. But I ·.
also think it serves a legitimate purpose to show that this same
process has come and gone more frequently than we think. First, real
or perceived loss or change occurs. Margins are too thin, and
businesses may fail. Jobs and investments might be lost or well-loved
products or ways of doing business disappear. Affected parties and
observers model the problem as an exception to the normal order,
arguing that low prices themselves, in the particular circumstances,
rob the market's ability to provide something that society needs. The
thing might be a product, an informational or marketing service, a
kind of retail organization, innovation, entrepreneurial opportunity,
the entry of new firms, a broad or "non-economic" social value, or
whatever. As it happens, I believe the history discloses another
common step in the process. After some sort of protection is deployed
for a while, to correct the perceived market failing, different evidence
emerges showing that in fact markets would have been able to figure
out solutions and that the protections just posed problems of their
own, if indeed they did any good at all.
This is a crude kind of reasoning on my part, even if one agrees
with my portrayal of the many arguments over time and their failures.
It does not logically follow that because something happened a certain
way before that it will again. But it seems useful to confront the
popular propensity to fear price competition by showing that it has
happened before, and that the fears have mostly not been borne out.
Importantly, in any case, while I explain at some length why I
think price rivalry can be trusted quite a lot, it is not ultimately
necessary for my basic theoretical claim to prove that all those
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critiques of price competition were wrong. My claim is that whether
they are right or wrong, the public is prone to believe in them, and
that if it looks for it the public can find similar evidence of harm from
price competition in most situations. That in itself is a fairly
significant result for competition policy, and how well it can be
expected to work. But more poignantly, if in fact the public is right
about how often price competition fails, that is then a very serious
policy problem. On the one hand, I don't happen to agree with
Professor Wickelgren that antitrust must or should bother with
"robust rule of reason" in all or most cases to accommodate local
failures of price rivalry (as to which see Part II.A to follow). But if it is
in fact true that problems serious enough to require the in-depth
inquiry that he seems to favor in nearly all antitrust litigation, then it
will work poorly at best and will be expensive and little used. If
antitrust must work in that way, then I think it is probably not worth
the trouble.
II. Two RESPONSES, THAT ARE MORE INTERRELATED THAN THEY MAy
SEEM

A. The Case for Simplicity: I'll Have the Bacon (Method), Please
I will confess that of the two essays, Professor Wickelgren's was
rather more frustrating, but only for the same reason that I think he
probably found my book frustrating as well. Though I think he and I
are largely on the same ideological side, for whatever that may be
worth, the difference between us is a very familiar one in antitrust and
it has sometimes gotten pretty hot. On the brighter side, dealing with
the things that frustrate us is usually all the more productive for us
personally.
Strictly speaking, Professor Wickelgren makes at least two
separate points, one of which I think is extremely good and I'll address
separately below,3 and the other of which I'll hit first. The one I
address first was less persuasive to me, but then again, it's the one
that has been the focus of so much disagreement in antitrust. It is
obviously a matter about which people can differ.
(1) The Rea.sonfor Simplicity: It Is a Mistake to Confuse Law and
Social Science. With my apologies, because Professor Wickelgren
3

See infra Part II.A.2.
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might characterize it differently or find my characterization
problematic, I see the difference between us as judging how much of
the cost of uncertainty in antitrust should be on defendants, and how
much on plaintiffs. His paper implies that it should be pretty heavily
on the plaintiffs, and that this is so because of a basic problem of
human epistemology. In this, his essay follows an assumption that has
dominated antitrust for at least forty years, and that has gone
essentially unquestioned even though it begs questions of
foundational significance. The assumption is that there is no
difference between social science and law. But indeed they differ a
great deal. To borrow famous words from Derek Bok, who, like
Professor Wickelgren, had formal training both as a lawyer and as an
economist:
Lawyers have perhaps not always been explicit enough
in articulating the peculiar qualifications which their
institutions place upon the unbridled pursuit of truth,
irritation...
[of]
even
thoughtful
[to the]
economists.... [But] [u]nless we can be certain of the
capacity of our legal system to absorb new doctrine, our
attempts to introduce it will only be more ludicrous in
failure and more costly in execution. 4
In abstract principle, we have framed the question in every
individual antitrust case to be the same: whether the challenged
conduct has a net-positive social impact. Because we now think the
"social impact" should be measured by "efficiency" as defined in
economic theory, that means in principle that the question is whether
the conduct causes a net-positive or net-negative change in surplus,
measured in dollars.s On some abstract level, that change itself could
be rigorously quantified and precisely measured. Obviously, though,
actually measuring it is problematic for various reasons, among them
that it is laborious, expensive, and inevitably controverted. So as a
matter of policy we have spared plaintiffs the cost of it in cases where
4 Derek C. Bok, Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act and the Merging ofLaw and Economics, 74
HARV. L. REv. 226, 228 (1960).

s With the usually minor qualification that, technically, it is not total welfare that counts,
but consumer surplus. See generally Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original
and Primary Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34
HAsTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (originating this now widely accepted argument).
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we think the risk of mistakenly condemning conduct is low enough
that a full demonstration just to make sure would seem unjustified.
We have often taken it as an important policy problem to decide which
cases should fall within categories exempted from full empirical
demonstration. That debate takes place both in academic journals and
in the decisions of federal judges. In the nature of things, it mostly
consists of theoretical arguments about whether particular categories
of conduct can be said to be reliably, categorically net-harmful. If so,
then in various ways we give plaintiffs some relief from full factual
demonstration of actual economic effects. Empirical evidence figures
as well, but typically the empirical evidence is scarce, and even where
it is plentiful the questions usually remain inconclusive or
controversial.
The making of this choice is Professor Wickelgren's only theme.
"Antitrust is complicated," he says in an introductory passage, and he
argues that trial procedures must accordingly be used to ventilate all
that complexity fully. 6 He so argues mainly because of what I will
describe as an epistemological problem. In making policy, it is hard
for us to think about the task except by categorizing kinds of conduct
and deciding how the different categories should be treated by law.
But the problem with categories is saying which things should be
included in them and which things excluded. No matter how carefully
we define a category, specific examples will occur that pose
unanticipated doubts whether they should be treated the same as
other instances in the category. We can never, in antitrust or
elsewhere, make legal rules with objective certainty, and it will always
be possible in principle to argue that some applications of a rule are
undesirable.
Professor Wickelgren argues that where there is uncertainty
whether particular cases should be in a prohibited category, we must
err on the side of caution. An issue in responding to his view is
knowing when he thinks there is sufficient "uncertainty." In fairness,
he does not say that every possible uncertainty should trigger full
blown balancing, but his explanation for how we make that call
seems-again with my apologies-capricious and uninformative. All
he really says is that some kind of "robust" review must happen
whenever arguments exist creating a "plausible" or "credible"
possibility that a category of conduct is even sometimes not harmful.
He doesn't say how that judgment is made or who makes it, but the
6

Wickelgren, supra note 1, at 354.
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essay makes it seem like a very low standard. At one point he says that
"[t]he current literature"-which is to say, the mostly a priori,
theoretical literature in economics and law speculating that particular
kinds of conduct might be harmful or beneficial-"makes clear that
any other approach" would be unacceptable. 7 With respect, I'm not
sure how the current literature makes anything "clear" to anyone. The
only thing that is clear from reading it is that questions left to a priori
speculation will always, irremediably remain unclear.
And so, if "uncertainty" depends on the presence of not plainly
false theoretical arguments in the literature demonstrating the
possibility of pro-competitive explanations, then I think defense
experts should be able to make the case for full-blown factual
consideration in just about any case except the narrow range of cases
now treated as a matter of law under per se or "quick look" standards.
Indeed I'm not really sure why Professor Wickelgren says that Apple
was so plainly a case for per se treatment. Even I don't doubt that'
reasonable people could consider Apple complex, with "plausible" or·;
"credible" reasons to suspect that the conspiracy could generate
benefits, and I wrote a whole book saying it should be illegal. After all,
in the Apple case, Apple had the assistance of an expert witness
named Benjamin Klein, who is not only a preeminent economist, but a
main progenitor in the RPM literature that Professor Wickelgren
considers plausible and credible. In Apple, Klein provided arguments
implying that Apple's conduct should not be automatically illegal.
Unless he was in this particular case a transparently obvious liar, it's
hard to see why we can just rule his arguments more obviously out of
order than in the RPM context. In fact, on Professor Wickelgren's
plausibility standard, defense experts should be able routinely to
mislead courts into treating horizontal cartels and naked hub-and
spoke deals with full-blown fact consideration, because in fact there
are very, very frequently arguments of abstract speculation available,
that are at least conceivably correct, that those things might do some
good.
In any case, to handle this complexity, Professor Wickelgren says
that "a robust rule of reason" is the only acceptable procedure for
antitrust cases wherever there is his specified measure of uncertainty.
He never quite says what it consists of, and as I'll explain, he may not
mean quite what he seems to. As it happens, a common problem when
people talk about the rule-of-reason is that they may be talking about
7

Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
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different things without knowing it. So, it may be that he and I do not
differ so much as either of us think. But it sounds like he favors
something I consider radical and very undesirable. The essay reads as
though he wants courts in most cases not only to apply the multi-step
burden-shifting procedure that now constitutes the full,
unabbreviated rule of reason. s He wants them always or commonly to
give defendants so much benefit of the doubt that there would be a
case-by-case "balancing" of the quantified costs and benefits of
challenged conduct. That is, he seems to be arguing not only about the
choice between per se and rule of reason treatment, but about how the
rule of reason should be applied. In most cases, a court would receive
evidence from at least one economist for each side on not only the
plaintiffs prima facie showing of anticompetitive effect-which
typically consists of a plausible theory of harm and proof of sizable
market share-and not only on whatever pro-competitive upsides the
defendant might allege, but also on the ultimate quantitative question
whether plaintiffs proof of actual harm outweighs whatever benefits
there might be. 9
If this is really Professor Wickelgren's vision for antitrust, then I'm
afraid I can't agree at all. First, he seems unconcerned with-and
never mentions, really-the widely shared abhorrence for case-by-case
judicial "balancing" in antitrust. 10 Actual balancing is disfavored by
academics, lawyers, and judges across the political spectrum for an
s See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015);
Cap. Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.
1993); Agnew v. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (?th Cir. 2012); PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, Vol. VII, ANTITRUST LAW 389-90 (3d ed. 2006).

See Wickelgren, supra note 1. There remains some real confusion over what is supposed
to happen at this very last step, since the caselaw implies that plaintiffs must also prove
that the defendant's purported benefits could be achieved by less harmful means. There is
little law on how courts actually should handle this tail-end of the analysis, no doubt
because reaching it is so rare, but in any case, there are seriously conflicting signals within
the caselaw how it actually works. See Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse ofthe Less
Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule ofReason Analysis, 58 AM. U.L. REV. 561, 561
(2009). It does not really matter much for what I say here.
9

See, e.g., ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW
IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 207 (2d ed.
2008); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLES AND EXECUTION 30
(2005); Peter C. Carstensen, The Content ofthe Hollow Core ofAntitrust: The Chicago
Board of Trade Case and the Meaning ofthe ''Rule ofReason" in Restraint ofTrade
Analysis, in 15 REsEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 65-68 (Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Victor
P. Goldberg eds., 1992).
10
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important reason that he doesn't acknowledge. The problem is
definitely not just that it is difficult and costly. That is admittedly its
own concern, and I humbly submit it is a big one. It probably pretty
significantly impedes the bringing of actions by the contingency-fee
class action lawyers who finance virtually all antitrust enforcement in
America.n Rather, it so happens to be just deeply unlikely to improve
accuracy. Even under the best circumstances, the measurement
involves complexity-really, philosophical challenges-beyond human
capacity to manage objectively. In the end, even in best-case
circumstances, we can only estimate the welfare consequences of any
particular conduct, and different economists' estimates will ordinarily
differ substantially.
To be sure, in a significant way, this emphasis on adjudication
through fulsome social science analysis, rather than through
categorical rules fashioned by courts over time, is really just a
procedural distinction. But it is an important one, and it seems to me
likely to make antitrust litigation less rather than more accurate. Its
real effect is to put even more of antitrust decision-making into the
hands of the individual expert-witness economists hired by the
parties. Cases will still be decided by non-economist factfinders
which could be a lay jury if either party exercises its right to one. 12 The
difference would be that in each case they would have freedom to
decide not only the facts needed for application of a judge-made rule,
but which of two opaquely complex expert positions better captures
the actual state of the world.
It is in part for these reasons that true net-benefits balancing, in
which a fact-finder in merits litigation formally chooses among expert
economists' quantified estimates of welfare consequences, is very rare.

11 With respect, Professor Wickelgren's one point attempting to downplay this cost is
wholly unpersuasive. He says that requiring plaintiffs to put on fuller rule-of-reason
demonstrations will not matter, because, as did the Justice Department in the Apple case,
they already routinely plead and prepare both per se and rule of reason allegations in the
cases they bring. Wickelgren, supra note 1, at 360. But that is, candidly, ridiculous. They
do that, but only because the only cases they bring, by and large, are cases they feel pretty
sure will give them per se or quick look treatment. That they add rule of reason allegations
is not because they like rule of reason cases or do not consider them costly. They add them
as failsafes so that the cases they are hoping are per se cases-the only cases they really
bring-will not get tossed if a judge decides per se treatment is not appropriate.

12

See, In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631F.2d1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980).
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In American law, it almost never happens.13 That could be so for
various reasons, including that antitrust litigation itself is relatively
rare and those antitrust suits that are filed rarely reach the final merits
on any standard. But balancing is also thought to be rare just because
courts avoid it when they can, through means for early dismissal or by
resolving cases either on the primafacie showing or the defendant's
initial rebuttal. Even those who argue that this still involves a kind of
balancing recognize that full net-benefits consideration is
problematic, and favor the search for judge-made short-cuts. 14
But all that said, I have a bigger problem with this fulsome-fact
inquiry agitation, and it goes to whether antitrust can exist as a
meaningful policy or not. Professor Wickelgren does not state it in
these terms and does not cite the relevant literature, but his argument
follows more or less directly the reasoning of the so-called "decision
theory" or "error cost" literature in antitrust. Decision-theory
advocates observe that in social science we approach the adoption of
conclusions skeptically and conservatively-we accept them only when
there is strong reason to do so. They argue that in law, just the same,
government should be reticent to act where there is uncertainty
surrounding challenged conduct. They have been criticized for any
number of specific incautiou~ assumptions and elisions, including a
surprisingly strong empirical assumption that entry is so generally,
globally easy and effective in American markets that markets self
correct better than antitrust can fix them. They made that claim with
no meaningful evidentiary support then or now. 1s
But the most important criticism of that reasoning, and one that I
think applies to Professor Wickelgren's essay, is that it is emphatically
not an ideologically neutral move to presume that law can simply
adopt the same epistemic conservatism as social science. Taking the
risk of antitrust uncertainty from defendants does not mean that it no
longer poses costs, and those costs are not just shifted to plaintiffs.
Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule ofReason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV.
1265, 1346 (compiling evidence that actual balancing is rare); Michael A. Carrier, The Rule
ofReason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MAsoN L. REY. 827, 829
(2009) (updating prior research and finding that actual balancing had become even less

13

common).
14

C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REY.

927, 947 (2016).

s See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of"Error Cost" Analysis: What's
Wrong with Antitrust's Right, 80ANTITRUSTL.J.1, 10, 12 (2015).

1
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They are shifted to society. Moreover, whatever he may intend, the
practical consequence of Professor Wickelgren's position-at least as it
seems to be stated here-will be that the government should do
nothing or little because humans remain irremediably
epistemologically frail. If (1) it is the case that a mere conjectural
possibility of uncertainty is enough to trigger trial procedures that
meaningfully impede enforcement, and (2) that there will always be
conjecturally possible doubts in every case or most of them, by virtue
of an epistemological frailty that is inalienably human, then a very
significant policy judgment has been made without much
consideration of the costs. In my opinion it would render antitrust
largely inert. 16
Admittedly, I, too, want to use the edifice of contemporary price
theory just as much as Professor Wickelgren does-all of it, as much as
economists can produce, and, even better, all the empirical testing of .
it that can be done. Indeed, to some large degree it is what my book is;.!
all about. I defended Apple and the very traditional antitrust rule it·'·
applied using economic arguments, and one of the main counter-.
arguments I challenged was the leftward view that the case should
have been handled on much simpler terms. Consistent with the
arguments of a popular movement in antitrust getting a lot of
attention right now, many said that Apple should be resolved on the
simple grounds that Amazon was very big, and therefore that it was
the antitrust problem. That would reflect that movement's return to
"structuralism" or the like, which is not so far all that clearly
elaborated, but appears to mean breaking up big firms and deciding
who is the bad guy in a given case by asking which one looks biggest. 1 7
I tend to agree with Professor Hovenkamp that just tallying up social
problems and assigning them to an anti-bigness policy is "worse than
useless," 18 and one reason I think so is that this group got the Apple
case itself so wrong. They saw that Amazon was big on various
measures, had behaved very aggressively, and compared it to the more
sympathetic figures of publishing houses and the authors they
represent. On that basis they decided that the only right policy was to
sue Amazon or do nothing at all. For reasons I spent about 500 pages
1

6 See

generally, id.; Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARYL.

REV. 75 (2010).
17

See, e.g., Lina Khan, Amazon'sAntitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 718 (2017).

18

Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REY. 71, 109 & n.214 (2018).
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explaining, it is contemporary price theory that shows why they were
mistaken. In some important sense, that was an argument for rules
based on complexity-rules formulated on the basis of economic
analysis-rather than simplicity-those that more or less ask who
looks like the bad guy. The rule actually applied by the courts in the
Apple case happens to be one that radically simplifies what happens in
the courtroom. But it has been formulated and defended by using the
full apparatus of contemporary price theory over a long time.
But to be clear, there is a key difference between how I would
deploy all that theoretical prowess and how Professor Wickelgren
would. He seems to want the full weight of economic theory to be
applied in each case to its particular facts, pretty much most of the
time. The exceptions would be apparently only hard-core cartel
restraints and the horizontal conspiracy cases now treated under the
"quick look." 19 Only in those cases would factual possibilities be taken
off the table as too implausible to waste the world's time. I think that
is a bad idea, for reasons I will explain. By contrast, I want to use
economic theory and empirical evidence to fashion rules, to whatever
extent possible, before litigation. I favor common-law antitrust rules
made by judges over time with the input of our system's large
economic and legal commentariat. In the case of United States v. X, I
would urge that to whatever extent possible, the court should be
permitted only to ask whether some set of objective facts of the
market's nature and X's conduct imply harm at odds with antitrust
law, as determined through academic debate before litigation.
I humbly do not believe much is added by the cases that Professor
Wickelgren discusses to show that "robust" net-benefits
measurements are desirable. He points to NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. ofOklahoma20 as proof that despite their cost and difficulty,
rule-of-reason cases "can be viable." 21 But the Court there took one of
the best-known short-cuts in contemporary antitrust, and stressed at
length that courts should use their judgment in appropriate cases
radically to circumvent all the case-specific factual inquiry that
Professor Wickelgren says is the only way to handle most antitrust
cases. Likewise, he takes the Justice Department's famous and ill
1
9 Abraham L. Wickelgren, Determining the Optimal Antitrust Standard: How to Think
About Per Se versus Rule ofReason, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 52, 54 (2012).

20

468 U.S. 85 (1984).

21

Wickelgren, supra note 1, at 360.
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fated monopolization suit against American Airlines 22 as proof that
simple antitrust rules are bad. His point here is a little unclear to me,
and I hope I'm not unfairly missing something, but that case strikes
me as showing the outright failure of "robust" analysis. It is quite true
that the doctrinal predation standard applied there, first adopted by
the Supreme Court in the 199os, 2 3 is a "simple" rule in the sense that it
states a nominally bright-line rule for illegality. But making the factual
demonstration needed to meet the elements of that bright-line test is
an intensely factual, uncertain inquiry flawed by all the sins of full
blown net-benefits balancing. The plaintiff and defendant must put on
the testimony of competing expert witnesses who have to sort through
not just a large volume of evidence, but conceptually difficult
uncertainties about which costs are variable and which are not, which
are properly allocable to the goods in question, and so on and so on.
And, sure enough, the cost and difficulty of making this showing has·
essentially killed price predation as a viable theory of antitrust'
liability. It is now a common-place that price predation plaintiffs·
essentially never win, but what is less well-known is that they just
never bring the cases at all. 24 If price predation can sometimes be
anticompetitive, as Professor Wickelgren apparently believes, 2 s then a
doctrinal procedure making it so hard to prove that no one is willing
to challenge it anymore is not a very desirable approach.
But anyway, again, I think Professor Wickelgren and I may not
actually be so far apart as all that makes it sound. As is often the case
in discussing antitrust standards, I think we may just misunderstand
each other. In a different paper, Professor Wickelgren once wrote this:

22

Id. at 358 (discussing United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003)).

23

See, Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).

In the course of countering this very common claim, Professor Crane once pointed out
that one plaintiff did in fact win a jury verdict after Brooke Group, that three others
procured settlements, and that overall at least 57 complaints alleged predation. Daniel A.
Crane, The Paradox ofPredatory Pricing, 91 CORNELLL. REV. 1, 4 & n.12, 15-16 (2005).
(He actually omits one other significant success, presumably because summary judgment
for the defendant was not reversed until just after his article had gone to print. See Spirit
Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005)). However, between Brooke
Group in 1993 and Professor Crane's article in 2005, there were something on the order of
10,000 antitrust filings. So it appears that plaintiffs didn't even bother to allege predation
in more than about o.6% of all antitrust cases, and they achieved even limited success in no
more than about 0.05% of them.
24

2

s Wickelgren, supra note 19, at 53.
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One way to express the justification for the per se rule
is that the probability that... evidence will exist [that
could
overcome
the
presumption
of
anticompetitiveness in a particular case] is so small
that it is not worth examining it. In that light, one can
also view the structured rule of reason approach as one
that should (although, in practice may not) reflect a
similar paradigm in less extreme cases: we require
stronger evidence of anticompetitive effects for conduct
that we think are less likely to be anticompetitive and
are more receptive to procompetitive effects arguments
in such cases. 2 6
If I understand correctly, and he sees this as an acceptable way to
make antitrust rules, then I think the space between us actually gets
pretty small. All I really want is to use economic theory and empirical
evidence to measure those same probabilities and formulate those
judgments into rules. In my judgment, the theory and evidence
unsurprisingly support a fairly strong preference for goods to be
produced by comparatively numerous autonomous units vying non
cooperatively for the same customers on the basis of quality-adjusted
price. That is, the evidence pretty strongly favors price competition
most of the time, and so we just don't have to be that solicitous of
arguments for avoiding it.
In practical effect, the only change I envision from current law
would be no more radical than shifting the burden of antitrust
uncertainty back to where it had been for a long time-on defendants.
That does not mean adopting per se rules or prohibiting defendants
from defending themselves. It means measuring the probability that
pro-competitive values can exist in academic debate, before litigation,
to make rules by which the courts remove the ultimate decision from
the realm of capricious fact-finders attempting to choose between
extremely complex reports prepared by experts paid to serve the
parties' interests.
Finally, this all begs what seems to me an important and virtually
never-asked question. Why is it that we put so much more effort into
this kind of argument in antitrust than in most other areas of law?
Other areas of law, including tort-like, law enforcement rules
resembling antitrust, also pose significant risks of interfering with
what may be socially desirable business conduct. Is compliance with
26

Id. at53.
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antitrust rules really so much more costly than compliance with, say,
the law of fraud or bribery? Or, for that matter, real estate
conveyancing? In those areas we tend not to see massive literatures of
scholastically metaphysical navel-gazing to measure whether the
precise tuning of its rules could be net allocationally inefficient. I don't
really know the explanation, though I have some guesses. For one
thing, while I don't think this is true at all of Professor Wickelgren, for
some agonistes it's really just politics. They tend to renounce the very
suggestion pretty bitterly, but occasionally we see the
acknowledgment of a genuine insider that conservative antitrust has
had less interest in social-scientific truth for its own sake than in
undermining the legitimacy of big government. 2 1 But for those many
whom this does not capture, like, I imagine, Professor Wickelgren, I
think there is a different explanation. We consider social-scientific
standards of empirical skepticism appropriate to antitrust law because '
there happens to be an entire profession devoted to it. There is an .,
entire academic and professional institution devoted to industrial
organization economics, and its professional mores are rather .
imperial in their designs on the rest of the world.
In the end, the reason I think this is all about bacon (that is, the
preference for empirical investigation over a priori speculation,
associated with Francis Bacon) is not that I think the state of
econometrics or the evidence existing on any particular question
makes anything simple. Rather, the disagreement between Professor
Wickelgren and I goes to how much significance we would put on the
fact that humans can always come up with a priori arguments to
argue anything. It is the degree to which we would let the conceptual
possibility of pro-competitive explanations upend the application of
manageable rules. I think the mere possibility of uncertainty is
omnipresent, because it is irremediable in human nature. But I don't
think that the cost of uncertainty is always substantial or that it always
outweighs the cost of government quietude.
IBtimately, I believe the question is not whether we should
entertain complexity. Of course we should. The question is at what
point in the policy process we should give it the time of day.
(2) That Other Thing, That Was Really Good: Antitrust as a
Theory of the Firm. In the course of making the argument above,

2

7

See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Limits ofAntitrust and the Chicago School Tradition, 6 J.

COMP. L. & ECON. 1, 9 (2010).
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Professor Wickelgren makes one specific point that I think is very
good and perceptive, and captures something I must address more
clearly in the book. It seems to me to go to the heart of the theoretical
contribution I hope to make. That he misunderstood me is my fault,
and it shows that I need more careful explanation.
In his extended defense of the economic literature on RPM,
Professor Wickelgren points out that it can be seen as just an
extension of a set of institutions we consider so legitimate that we
scarcely think about them. Firms exist, and they make their internal
decisions by fiat rather than exchange. Even if we did not take their
existence as a pre-conscious given-as most of us do most of the
time-an ingenious little theoretical literature happens to explain
them nicely. Assuming that markets do in fact optimize values in the
way that theory predicts, then wherever market exchanges are
costless, every decision made by every person would be made by
bilateral exchange between individuals. There would be no firms,
because hierarchical decisions within them could not improve on
market outcomes, and the costs of making them would therefore be
wasteful. 28 Professor Wickelgren objects to my characterization of the
RPM literature as "anti-market" (his words) because in fact everyone
agrees that there should be firms, because exchanges are in fact costly,
and sometimes more so than decision by internal fiat. And indeed the
transaction-cost literature has for a long time argued that vertical
integrations of various kinds-including by vertical contract-might be
desirable transaction-cost accommodations.
To some degree, I think Professor Wickelgren's points here reflect
a real and pretty uncharitable misunderstanding, though the blame is
mine for not explaining myself better and I hereby resolve to do so in
the final product. With respect I don't believe I have a "very extreme
view of the role of markets," and my position doesn't require some
insane, atomistic rejection of all long-term contracting (as my
discussion of the Addyston Pipe 2 9 case might have made clear, but
since it didn't I will expand it to make it more clear). I don't consider it
s The point was observed originally in Ronald H. Coase, The Nature ofthe Firm, 4
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937). It has been developed in various ways by many others, but
best known and most influential has been the "transaction cost" economics associated
chiefly associated with Oliver Williamson. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES (1975).

2

2 9 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), a.ffd as modified,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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important to prove that anyone is theologically "anti-market" or not.3°
Separately, I never say and I don't believe that theoretical defense of
RPM requires that consumers are "irrational."31 In misunderstanding
me on those points, Professor Wickelgren misunderstands my more
important point about the RPM literature. I take its history as an
example in which mere theoretical possibilities persuaded a lot of
people to suspend the usually strong presumption of economic theory
that competitors, including resellers of a thing, should compete with
each other on price. That example seemed important to me in part
because it involves the very mechanism at the heart of my theoretical
argument, and usefully shows it to be the same (in that respect) as
other defenses of private conduct that we don't usually think of as
related.
Specifically, many defenses of RPM argue that intra-brand
competition keeps resellers from providing costly services, like in
store demonstrations, well-trained sales staff, or brand-specific repair
facilities. But it is necessarily the case that if providing these services
is net socially desirable, then they will be provided in ordinary
competition unless something is wrong with the particular market in
question. The literature's own most important progenitor himself
recognized precisely this problem, and he said so in his most famous
paper. He there devised the "free-riding" defense of RPM precisely
because, in the absence of that externality, all retail services that
would be efficient would be provided without it.32
Professor Wickelgren says I mistook the RPM literature for an
argument of consumer irrationality because I say in the book that "the
claim was that consumers can't be trusted to know what they want,
and markets can't be trusted to give it to them." But by that I didn't
mean at all that RPM defenses assume consumer irrationality. Rather,
they assume a flaw that can keep markets from giving consumers what
30

Wickelgren, supra note 1, at 363.

31

Id. at 362.

See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86,
89 (1960 ). A handful ofother common justifications for RPM don't require this kind of
criticism of price competition, like the argument that new entrants may need to give
retailers the promise of some margin, through protection from intra-brand price
competition, just to secure any distribution at all. For what it may be worth, those
arguments have their own problems. See generally Warren S. Grimes, The Path Forward
After Leegin: Seeking Consensus Reform ofthe Antitrust Law ofVertical Restraints, 75
ANTITRUST L.J. 467, 482 (2008).
32
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they want, and betray-I humbly believe-a credulous willingness to
believe that such flaws are common and hard to address by any means
except restraining price competition. I guess from context I assumed
that would be apparent, but obviously I must clarify. Either way,
though, again, it doesn't really matter. My point was that, as in other
circumstances in which I think our unspoken propensity to doubt
price rivalry as an organizing tool, the history of the RPM literature
shows how easily mere conceptual, a priori suggestions of uncertainty
can throw our whole competition policy upside down.
Admittedly, the RPM example also seemed delicious to me,
because the defense of it has been the focus of such a massive
academic endeavor that in retrospect is coming to seem (to me)
ridiculous. Even its own most active voices have begun to
acknowledge that much of it has been abused and in various ways was
probably incorrect or oversold.
In any case, though, Professor Wickelgren's observation struck me
as far-sighted and perspicuous, and it will be of use to me. Economics
still mostly does without much of a theory of the firm, and antitrust
basically has none at all.33 In fact, antitrust is routinely and casually
ignorant of the many ways in which its rules imply some theory of the
firm, but leave its implications completely unexplored. As just one
routine example, it is rarely asked why "collusion" among separately
organized firms is so different than the decisions that would be made
by their board of directors if they all just merged. Exploring this
problem and its consequences for antitrust will most definitely play a
role either in my revisions in this book or in future work.

B. On Amazon: Dude, Totally
Professor Rub's generous and thoughtful essay touches on quite a
variety of specific points, which will be useful in my revisions,34 but it
seems important only to respond to one major theme. His most

See generally Chris Sagers, Why Copperweld Was Actually Kind ofDumb: Sound, Fury
and the Once and Still Missing Antitrust Theory ofthe Firm, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.

33

377 (2011).
34 I love, for example, his invocation of survey evidence showing how dismissive
economists are of public opinion. Rub, supra note 1, at 376 & n 51. I found myself
wondering why he didn't take it a next step and make what could have been a nice little
criticism of me and the antitrust politics I like-mea culpa!-as just reflecting what might
be a knee-jerking and unfounded elitism.

2018]

SAGERS

411

important criticism seemed to be that understanding the popular
reaction to United States v. Apple requires more consideration of how
Amazon might pose legitimate threats, even if they are not actionable
under American antitrust. Crucially, to me, he says that left-ward
criticism of the case did not actually depend on public antipathy or
misunderstanding of "competition" as such, but rather on ways that
Amazon posed real threats as a "monopoly" in senses not really
addressed by present law.3s That goes pretty directly to the heart of my
claim that the public opposition to the case was opposition to
competition itself. In the final book, I will respond to these points by
clarifying three important things.
First, I agree with Professor Rub emphatically that Amazon poses
serious threats and is a proper concern of public policy. I think he
mistook my explanation that Amazon would be difficult to sue-and
especially my criticism of the Apple defendants' price predation
claims-as an argument that Amazon should be difficult to sue, and
should not be constrained by antitrust. On the contrary, I think
Amazon deserves serious scrutiny, both by its raw size within its
various markets, and because of its record of conduct.
Fortunately, I happen to think Amazon is probably perfectly
subject to legal challenge now, under existing American law without
the need for any serious modification. On the one hand, I don't
actually agree with some of Professor Rub's characterizations of why
Amazon is threatening, as he takes a few things factually for granted
that could be quite significant. First, he believes that Amazon has
"very significant market power."36 It's not exactly clear, but he appears
to use this phrase in the way it is used in economics and antitrust: as
the power to raise price.37 I tend to agree with him that Amazon likely
has some pricing power, but with an important qualification. I don't
agree that Amazon could substantially raise its retail prices. Retail on
35 Id. at 370 (saying critics of Apple opposed Amazon for being a "monopoly" rather than
because they opposed "competition"; their views represented not an attack on competition,
but rather an "attack on monopolies and the risk they pose to competition.").
36

Id. at 370 n.4.

37 While Professor Rub doesn't explain his own understanding of"market power," he
sometimes says explicitly that Amazon could raise retail prices if it wanted to. He says that
Amazon "has enough market power to raise retail prices well beyond its marginal costs, but
it refrains from doing it," id. at 373; and that, for the time being, Amazon "transfers much
of the fruits of its market power to its consumers." Id. at 387. As a result, it "uses its power
to extract excessive surplus" from suppliers in order to "transfer it to consumers." Id.

412

I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

the whole has remained mostly quite competitive, and Amazon has
kept its dominance in large part by the unmatchable aggression of its
pricing. Rather, Amazon seems already a genuinely dangerous,
predatory monopsonist-a power buyer, as opposed to a power
seller-whose publicly-known conduct already seems like it could
make out a plausible case for the "exclusionary conduct" component
of an action under § 2 of the Sherman Act.38 I doubt that anyone
knows exactly why for sure, but securing distribution through Amazon
is now plainly significant enough that suppliers submit to
substantially oppressive demands and price pressures from Amazon.
Those things may not violate antitrust law, but if the power to impose
them was gotten through exclusionary means, then they do. In fact, I
think Amazon is pretty well on its way to serious federal antitrust
challenge that in many ways could resemble the famous United States
v. Microsoft.39 I tend to think such a case is more likely than not
within the next decade or so, barring a serious change to Amazon's
behavior or its fortunes. Though I would have thought any such
suggestion completely absurd a year ago, I think that in light of recent
events such a case is not that unlikely even during the Trump
administration. 4°
Second, Professor Rub stresses Americans' concerns that even if
some antitrust action were taken against Amazon, it wouldn't actually
address certain real social problems. He implies therefore that
Americans don't doubt competition as such, but antitrust. But I will
38

Monopsony actions are unusual in American law, but monopsonization is perfectly well
recognized as an actionable violation of§ 2, and where the claims are brought they are
doctrinally more or less indistinguishable from § 2 monopolization claims. See generally
ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARR!SON, MONOPSONYIN LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed.
2010).
39

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

4° Right now, everybody is trying to figure what is going on with the Trump
administration's antitrust program, and the honest answer is that no one outside the
agencies can be very sure. For the moment, most attention is fixed on the Justice
Department's surprising, apparently brave, and seemingly substantively strong challenge
to the merger ofAT&T and Time Warner, Inc. Before that suit was filed, there were many
highly varied, and mostly wrong, predictions of what would happen during the four years
of the Trump administration. The predictions mostly tended to anticipate a very restrained,
conservative, and hum-drum enforcement program. Now the question is whether the
AT&T/Time Warner challenge is a one-off-as some think, suspecting that it reflected not a
renewed enforcement vigor but the personal and political interests of President Trump-or
rather that it bespeaks a new commitment to vigorous merger control. In any case, see
generally Chris Sagers, #WLNothingMatters, 63ANTITRUSTBULL. 7 (2018).
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clarify that existing antitrust could actually address the specific
problems he identifies, at least if it is applied a little more vigorously.
For example, it is not somehow separately relevant, as distinct from
the harms addressed in a § 2 monopsony case, that as Amazon grows
in market power, the lower wholesale prices it negotiates will reduce
authors' revenues. 41 That is in fact the whole point of having a public
policy against monopsony, and it is the same whether or not the
sellers happen to enjoy intellectual property rights. The harm is a loss
of revenues to authors and other suppliers that leads to inefficient loss
of supply and incentives to innovate. Accordingly, it would be better to
favor antitrust control of both Apple and Amazon, instead of neither.
Therefore, to me, the real policy question is not so much whether
Amazon's power should be controlled, but how. Vigorous antitrust
toward Amazon right now would commend a few specific steps. Above
all, the agencies would benefit from ongoing investigation of Amazon
and the other major platforms, and it would be surprising if they have
not already done a large amount of it. At least three things would seem
quite important for them to surveil. Above all, they should be working
to understand if and how Amazon has acquired power as · a
monopsony buyer. That could mean, among other things,
understanding why online distribution over Amazon came to be so
critical to so many suppliers, and also understanding the many
documented means by which Amazon has disadvantaged its
competitors, suppliers, and even the firms that sell things on its own
"Amazon marketplace."42 It could also mean bigger-picture theoretical
work to understand how Amazon's raw size or the nature of its
business-for example, a network or scope-economy advantage of
being almost literally "the everything store" -somehow give it power

4' See Rub, supra note 1, at 387. It is not correct, incidentally, that where one firm controls
a vital point in distnbution then "that market" in which it is dominant "does not really
exist." Id. at 385. It exists perfectly well. The market's existence manifests in the fact that
the monopolist cannot just set any price it wants. Instead, just like every participant in
every market, it sets price so that marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The operation of
even that monopolized market would cause any other price to be less profitable to the
monopolist. See CHRIS SAGERS, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: ANTITRUST§ 2.3.3 (2d ed.
2014).
42 See, e.g., OLIVIA LAVECCHIA & STACY MITCHELL, INST. FOR LoCAL SELF-RELIANCE,
AMAWN'S STRANGLEHOLD: How THE COMPANYS TIGHTENING GRIP Is STIFLING
COMPETITION, ERODING JOBS, AND THREATENING COMMUNITIES (2016),
https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ILSR_AmazonReport_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H6CP-3HVQ] (cataloguing many specific instances).
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over suppliers, and whether anything about it might be illegal. Second,
they should have a careful ongoing concern for Amazon's unilateral
vertical relationships, and whether it is using them to shore up power,
either as a buyer or a seller. It seems that now that Amazon's market
shares are very large, its ability to start shoring up exclusivities either
forward or backward seem threatening. Finally, regulators should
consider the longer-term, dynamic machinations that may be at play
in Amazon's long history of acquisitions, many of which in retrospect
look like fairly exclusionary plans to dominate existing or new sectors.
Professor Rub tells the well-known story of Amazon's acquisition of
Diapers.com, but that is only one among many.
As a third and final clarification, I definitely agree with an ultimate
conclusion he suggests, and I did not mean to imply otherwise. In the
end, capitalism poses some problems that have no very good solution,
and certainly it does not solve them just to have more competition. We
will have to live with that even if there are not really any plausible
alternatives to it as a basic system. In one respect, however, it seems
like we very plausibly could and should solve some of those problems
just by making use of some policies other than competition. And so,
we plainly do need a social welfare policy to mitigate capitalism's
harsh side-effects-particularly the problem of those who are the
losers during times of technological or other transition. That seems
like something we could manage with progressive taxation and social
welfare programs. As a matter of fact, we need such policies for two
separate reasons. First, it is plain that microeconomic price
competition leaves unaddressed certain problems that are incumbent
to address, like inequality of wealth and the distribution of losses
following change. It is incumbent both morally and because
preserving wealth equity seems likely to have macroeconomic
benefits.
But a wholly separate reason to address those harms is to preserve
the political viability of antitrust itself. If it is true, as Arnold said, that
antitrust enforcement depends on the public attitude, then a serious
threat to its legitimacy would be the public perception that it causes
ills like these. To borrow from Arthur Schlessinger, "[t]hose who
would now have government abandon social responsibility in the
name of unbridled individualism are doing Marx's work for him ...
"43

43

ARTHUR M. SCHLESSINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 244 (1986).
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This all goes to something important I tried to explain toward the
end of the book. It obviously is true that competition generates some
harms that seem necessa:ry to remedy, and that competition itself
cannot solve. But it does not follow at all that limiting competition is
the right solution. Competition does well what it does in its own
sphere, but it needs the support of other policies too.
III. THE COMMON THREAD
In the end, I think both these essays really were about one thing,
and I need to clarify that the book itself was actually about another
thing entirely. On some level, all three of us agree with the premise
that there is a problem in America, at this contempora:ry moment, and
the job is to figure out the policy to fix it. But Professors Wickelgren
and Rub both take the problem to be that Amazon is big and its
suppliers have conspired. They say I should reconsider the doctrinal
antitrust specifics to tinker out a correction.
I say in fact that the problem of interest is actually much deeper
and inherent in the having of a competition policy at all, and it is
fundamentally a political or sociological problem. Having such a
policy, at least on the tort-style law enforcement model that has
existed in America and most other countries with antitrust laws,
means having markets and letting them work. (Even on much more
aggressive plans that is true; on a no-fault monopoly or affirmative
deconcentration plan, for example, the goal at some point is just to let
markets do the regulating.) But we forget much too easily that
markets in their ordina:ry operation are machines for producing pain.
And we have repeatedly, throughout the histo:ry of antitrust,
misconstrued that pain for defects in markets themselves requiring
either internal self-regulation or government intervention to protect
firms from competition. So the problem in this problem-book is not
that firms conspired or that Amazon is big. It is that antitrust itself
seems not to work well under many circumstances for the simple
reason that, whether they know it or not, the people don't believe in it.
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